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Abstract 
Primary empires were the product of internal development and self-sustaining through the 
exploitation of their own resources, but there were also historically a large number of 
“shadow empires.” These were imperial polities that were the products of secondary empire 
formation, which came into existence as a response to the formation of primary empires 
elsewhere and could not exist except in interaction with them. One unusual subset of these 
were “empires of nostalgia” that claimed an imperial tradition and the outward trappings of 
an extinct empire, but did not themselves meet the basic requirements of an imperial state 
such as direct control of territory, true centralized rule, or significant urban centers. The most 
famous European example was the Carolingian Empire established by Charlemagne and its 
long lived successor, the Holy Roman Empire, which survived as an institution for a 
thousand years. The Islamic State’s proclamation of itself as a reborn caliphate is now a 
contemporary example built on nostalgia in the Islamic world for a long-dead empire that still 
exerts a strong cultural attraction upon many Muslims. The Islamic State justifies its actions 
and ideologies by attempting to ground them in a lost golden age that they propose to 
restore. 
 
 
Introduction 
So rush O Muslims and gather around your khalīfah, so that you may return as you 
once were for ages, kings of the earth and knights of war. Come so that you may be 
honored and esteemed, living as masters with dignity. Know that we fight over a 
religion that Allah promised to support. We fight for an ummah to which Allah has 
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given honor, esteem, and leadership, promising it with empowerment and strength 
on the earth. Come O Muslims to your honor, to your victory. By Allah, if you 
disbelieve in democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as all the other garbage 
and ideas from the west, and rush to your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will 
own the earth, and the east and west will submit to you. This is the promise of Allah 
to you. This is the promise of Allah to you.1 
The declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic State in June 2014 revived debates on the nature of 
the caliphate itself, which had formerly seemed to be a topic of interest only to Muslim 
theologians and historians of the Islamic world. One key question was how a movement that 
emerged in a civil war environment in Syria (where factions among the Sunni majority sought the 
ouster of the minority Alawite dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad) and Iraq (where a Sunni minority 
was alienated from Shi’ite majority national government) could attract so many foreign Muslims to 
fight for it under the Islamic State banner. After all, civil wars sparked by fierce political grievances 
are common worldwide, but rarely attract enthusiastic foreign volunteers willing to die for them. 
But as Alexis de Tocqueville noted in regard to the French Revolution, movements claiming to be 
based on universal ideas transcend such boundaries and have a different dynamic: 
By seeming to tend rather to the regeneration of the human race than to the reform 
of France alone, it roused passions such as the most violent political revolutions had 
been incapable of awakening. It inspired proselytism, and gave birth to 
propagandism; and hence assumed that quasi religious character which so terrified 
those who saw it, or, rather, became a sort of new religion, imperfect, it is true, 
without God, worship, or future life, but still able, like Islamism, to cover the earth 
with its soldiers, its apostles, and its martyrs.2 
As Tocqueville’s reference to the rise of Islam indicates, before the late eighteenth century 
movements that inspired such widespread trans-national mobilization had always been religious 
in nature, the most recent example being the rise of Protestantism in sixteenth century Western 
Europe and the political upheavals it produced. While succeeding movements of this type in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (democratic, nationalist, or socialist) were all secular in origin, 
they did share something in common with similar earlier religious movements. Like their 
predecessors, they were future-oriented, proclaiming the promise of a new and better world once 
the corrupt old one was swept away. Whether religious or secular, all promised their followers an 
idealized future in which sacrifice today would be redeemed in a better tomorrow. 
By contrast, the Islamic State is backward-looking. Instead of calling for sacrifice to create a new 
future utopia, it seeks to revive a structure long dead—the Islamic caliphate—interpreting it as the 
lost Muslim ideal that can be restored only by using past Islamic precedents as a strict template. 
No policy, law, or political strategy can be deemed legitimate unless it is grounded in the 
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institutions and examples provided by the early Muslim state and its divinely guided leaders. In 
this process the Islamic State rejects the structure of the modern nation state system and seeks 
to replace it with a universal empire of religion, announcing that all existing state structures lose 
their legitimacy upon the arrival of the caliphate: “The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and 
organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival of its troops to 
their areas.”3 Like similar religious movements in the past, it promises its followers either ultimate 
victory or the consolation of bringing the world itself to an end in a fiery apocalypse. 
While literature on the caliphate is enormous, not enough attention has been paid to its recent re-
creation as a variety of secondary imperial state formation in which the trappings and ideologies 
of long lost empires are used as a political tool to build a new one. Such “empires of nostalgia” 
draw on a strong cultural tradition of a perceived golden age that can be reclaimed now or in the 
near future. Only one of many types of secondary empire, empires of nostalgia have a distinct 
form that is rooted in very deep and specific cultural traditions whose appeal is usually a mystery 
to those who do not share it. Further, in the twenty-first century the Islamic State is not alone in 
appealing to nostalgia for vanished empires. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Vladimir 
Putin now portrays Russia as the beleaguered defender of an Eastern Orthodox religious legacy 
inherited from the Byzantines, appealing to a peculiarly Russian cultural ethos that undergirds it. 
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken to reviving an appeal to the memory of the 
Ottoman Empire that the founders of Turkish Republic abolished and buried. The Communist 
Party heirs to Mao’s radical assaults on traditional Chinese culture now have a string of worldwide 
Confucius Institutes to market these formerly attacked values worldwide. Both empires and 
nostalgia are thus worth a closer look. 
A world of empires: primary and secondary 
Until the end of the First World War, empires were the most complex and dominant form of 
political organization in Eurasia, and had been so for more than two millennia. They had two 
distinctive forms that had different origins: large primary empires that that were self-generating 
and self-supporting, and smaller (in territory or population) secondary empires that emerged in 
response to them. In some cases, overly successful secondary empires transformed themselves 
by evolving into primary ones, usually through campaigns of conquest and incorporation into a 
larger hybrid system. 
Primary empires were states established by conquest that had sovereignty over continental- or 
subcontinental-sized territories that incorporated millions or tens of millions of people into a 
unified and centralized administrative system.4 They financed themselves largely from internal 
resources through systems of direct taxation or tribute payments derived from their component 
parts. They maintained large and permanent military forces to protect marked frontiers and 
preserve internal order. Historically, primary empires were one or two orders of magnitude larger 
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in territory and population than rival polities that (if they avoided incorporation) lived on their 
margins: regional kingdoms, city-states, or tribal confederations. Classic examples from Eurasia 
included the many empires that united China (Qin, Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing dynasties) over 
the course of two millennia,5 the Roman and Byzantine Empires that long dominated the 
Mediterranean basin,6 and the many iterations of the Persian Empire and its successor states on 
the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia.7 
After the rise of Islam, the caliphate became a huge primary empire that ran from Spain and 
North Africa through the Arab Middle East and beyond into the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia.8 
Upon its breakup, successor primary empires eventually appeared in what had become the 
Islamic world. The largest and most long-lasting was the Ottoman Empire that first emerged in the 
thirteenth century and by the eighteenth ruled from the Balkans to the borders of Iran, from the 
Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and parts of North Africa. But other significant and 
long-lasting empires in the Muslim world that emerged around the same time period were 
established by the Timurids in Central Asia, the Safavids in Iran, and the Mughals in India.9 
Such primary empires may have begun with the hegemony of a single region or ethnic group, but 
they all became more cosmopolitan over time with the incorporation of new territories and people 
very different from themselves. Indeed, the main characteristic of a successful primary empire 
was its ability to thrive on diversity and make it a strength. An important aspect of its political 
structure, one that gave it great stability, was that the empire's founding ruling elite could be 
replaced without bringing about the collapse of the state structure. Polities whose founding elites 
defined the state by their exclusive dominance of it lacked this capacity—they either had to limit 
the size of the state to one they could manage unaided, or risk its collapse at the hands of 
disaffected peoples whose own elites became permanent enemies of the state. The leaders of 
the early Islamic conquests experienced this tension firsthand when they broke away from a 
narrow conception of participation (Islam as a religion exclusive to the Arabs) to a strikingly 
diverse one (Islam as a world religion) in which all believers could potentially be part of a single 
political system in which there was an opportunity for a wide range of people to participate. 
Empires were aided in this process by various types of long-term imperial projects designed to 
imprint particular aspects of their own cultural system on all peoples under their rule. It was not an 
attempt by the elite to create clones of themselves, but rather to foster a common core of values 
that would add to existing ones. It was a project that moved in stages from coercion and 
cooptation to cooperation and identification. It produced a vision of unity that extended well 
beyond force and created what we often identify as a civilization that long outlasted the political 
system that first produced it. 
Examples include the use of Chinese ideographs and Confucian models of morality and 
governance in East Asia, or the survival of the use of Latin and Roman law and administration in 
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the West. Religion could also prove a strong foundation for an imperial project in some parts of 
the world, as when the Romans and Byzantines began to see themselves as protectors and then 
missionaries for Christianity. Of course, the common use of the term “Islamic world” even today is 
a legacy of the founders of the caliphate whose project of making Muslim identity paramount over 
all others long survived that institution’s political collapse. 
If classic primary empires were the product of internal development and sustained themselves 
through the exploitation of their own resources, there were also a large number of imperial polities 
that were the products of secondary empire formation. That is, they came into existence as a 
response to primary imperial state formation elsewhere. Although they often had tremendous 
power and influence, and mimicked primary empires in their actions and policies, they lacked 
most of their essential attributes. Most notably, they often exerted direct rule over relatively few 
people, even when their geographical scope was huge. But the common element that really set 
all of them apart from primary empires was the absence of an internal domestic resource base 
sufficient to support the polity, and a dependence on external resources to make up that 
deficiency. Secondary empires acquired these resources in various ways, but always from people 
and states they did not attempt to rule directly. They were thus “shadows” that took on the form 
and power of primary empires without all of their substance. 
There were four different types of shadow empires: 
Mirror empires that rose and fell in tandem with their rivals because they were 
responses to challenges presented by a neighbor's imperial centralization. The best 
examples are the series of nomadic empires in Mongolia that emerged when China 
was unified under native Chinese dynasties.10 The danger China presented gave 
incentive for the nomads to unite, but these polities preserved themselves only by 
extracting resources from China, not by taxing their own people. Classic dyads 
included the Han/Xiongnu from 200 BCE to 200 CE and the Tang/Turks from 600–
900 CE. When native Chinese dynasties collapsed, so did their nomadic 
counterparts that had become parasitically dependent on them. 
Maritime trade empires that held the minimum amounts of territory needed to extract 
economic benefits from other polities that organized the production of the goods they 
traded. By focusing their investments on ports and strong navies, they attempted to 
control the means of exchange rather than the means of production. Examples 
include imperial Athens, Carthage, and Venice. In early modern times the 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British penetration of Asia took this form.11 They were 
vulnerable to rival naval powers but tended to be shattered only when existing land-
based powers were strong enough to either destroy their trade networks or target 
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their centers for elimination, as when Rome destroyed Carthage or the Spartans 
defeated the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. 
Vulture empires that were created by leaders of frontier provinces or client states 
who turned the tables on their erstwhile imperial masters in times of political and 
economic distress by seizing control of parts of the old empires. They 
characteristically sought to adopt the cultural values and administrative structures of 
the primary empires they occupied rather than impose new ones. Although their 
systems of governance were less sophisticated than the imperial systems they 
replaced, the ability to preserve order in the midst of anarchy gave them a 
competitive advantage. Ironically, the more successful they proved to be at restoring 
order, the more they undermined the rationale for their rule. They historically lost 
power when the structure of the old regime and its indigenous elites recovered 
enough to exclude the interlopers. Examples of such vulture empires include most of 
the many foreign dynasties that ruled north China,12 or the Nubians who briefly ruled 
ancient Egypt.13 In other cases, vulture empires emerged as masters of weak 
secondary imperial polities that lay beyond the reach of bigger primary empires. 
These shadow empires, such as the Hapsburg dynasty in Central Europe or the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Eastern Europe, incorporated neighboring marginal 
territories but never produced an overwhelmingly strong center to unify them.14 
Empires of nostalgia were based on the remembrance of organizations past. They 
claimed an imperial tradition and the outward trappings of an extinct empire, but 
could not themselves meet the basic requirements of an imperial state such as direct 
control of territory, true centralized rule, or significant urban centers. Indeed, they 
often lacked the territorial size or population to justify their pretensions—as when 
rulers of former provinces of an old empire promoted themselves to imperial rank. 
Examples include the medieval Carolingian Empire established by Charlemagne and 
its long-lived successor, the Holy Roman Empire. 15 As Voltaire acerbically 
complained, the “agglomeration that was called and which still calls itself the Holy 
Roman Empire is neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire,”16 yet it survived as an 
institution for one thousand years.17 No better definition of a shadow empire of 
nostalgia could be had. As we will see, the caliphate has had a similar hold on the 
Islamic imagination. 
Shadow empires in each of these categories could on some occasions evolve into true primary 
empires. The Mongol Empire founded by Genghis Khan in 1206 began like other mirror nomadic 
empires seeking only to extort northern China but ended up conquering it, and most of Eurasia as 
well, to become the largest land empire in history under his successors.18 Few maritime empires 
successfully moved to directly rule the lands they exploited economically, but the expansion of 
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the British in India from a group of private armed traders in the seventeenth century to rulers of 
the whole subcontinent in the mid-nineteenth is an example of how it could be done.19 And while 
most vulture dynasties that ruled north China were never able to expand very far south, in 1644 
the Manchu Qing dynasty did—quickly moving from vultures to become primary imperial rulers of 
all China for the next two-and-a-half centuries.20 When secondary empires did transform 
themselves into primary ones, however, the legacy of their earlier experiences as outsiders often 
profoundly affected how they saw the world. Unlike native Chinese rulers like the Ming dynasty it 
succeeded, for example, the Qing treated non-Han peoples as potential partners to be co-opted 
rather than inveterate enemies to be walled off.21 In South Asia, even after their de facto 
displacement of the Mughals and other powerful Indian states, the British were loath to take on 
the formal responsibilities of governance, and never lost their mercantile preoccupations that put 
profit first. Only after various forms of indirect rule failed and put their position in India at risk 
during the so-called Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 did the British government in London finally end the 
East India Company’s responsibility for administration there.22 
Empires of nostalgia and cultural memory 
Of all the shadow empires, those based on nostalgia are perhaps the most unusual and the most 
shadowy. They exist only in the minds of those who perceive them and are rooted in conceptions 
of empires past that never truly existed in the ideal forms that were attributed to them. Their 
origins were firmly rooted in the lasting cultural memory left by powerful empires on the regions 
and peoples they ruled or bordered. When these empires collapsed (particularly if that collapse 
resulted in many generations of political anarchy, population decline, and economic decay), the 
extinct imperial structure was often imbued with the aura of a former “golden age” now lost. 
The memory of this empire and its trappings retained such an ideological hold over future 
generations that it could be used as a powerful tool in later times when new rulers sought to build 
states or empires of their own. It also provided many of them with templates for building a large-
scale administration where these had disappeared. This tendency was strongest in China where 
the cosmological myth of a necessary emperor ruling “All under Heaven” emerged even before it 
was fully united, and later provided the impetus to recreate a united empire after it was lost.23 Any 
conquerors who could reunite China after a period of disunion—even “barbarians” like the 
Mongols and Manchus—were deemed legitimate if they succeeded.24 The founding myth of unity 
that came into being with the first Qin emperor in the third century BCE was so strong that (unlike 
in the West) primary empires succeeded in reuniting China after each period of state collapse. 
(Some today would see the People’s Republic of China as the latest in this series of unified 
Chinese states attempting to restore its former status as the dominant power in East Asia.) 
China's success in recreating imperial unity after collapse (periods that often spanned many 
centuries) was the exception rather than the rule, however. In most places the dream of 
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reestablishing a primary empire in its past form always remained a distant hope rather than an 
achievable reality. Still, the very idea of the old empire provided an ideological basis for those 
leaders seeking to centralize power against the opposition of powerful local elites. Charlemagne’s 
Carolingian Empire fell squarely into this category because it lacked most of the basic necessities 
of state formation, let alone empire formation. Early medieval Europe lacked big urban centers 
and an integrated economy. Its rulers could raise only rudimentary taxes and relied on feudal 
troop levies rather than standing armies. Indeed, the entire feudal system of land grants run by 
autonomous local notables was antithetical to Roman principles of imperial rule. These continued 
only in the Roman Catholic Church, whose hierarchical clergy and institutional ownership of land 
far better reflected a Roman imperial template.25 
Still, it was recognized as an empire at the time, and continues to hold an outsized place in 
medieval European history. Why? Because it was the first widely accepted attempt to bring back 
the political model of Rome to the Catholic Christian West, and it struck a powerful cultural chord 
in regions that saw themselves as falling far below the level of civilization that had once existed. It 
would serve as a potent ideological weapon in the (ultimately unsuccessful) drive to centralize the 
petty states of feudal Europe into a single imperial polity, as well as later giving Western Europe 
an imperial vision of itself in dealing with the Islamic world during the Crusades.26 It had far less 
of an impact in the territories of the Eastern Roman Empire where the Byzantines (allied with the 
Eastern Orthodox Christian Church) successfully maintained a unified imperial structure and 
centralized military for a millennium after its collapse in the West.27 
In empires of nostalgia, rulers tied their own legitimacy to something that no longer existed but 
still attracted willing participation: the desire to be part of a political project that inspired hope of 
better things to come by appealing to past glory. Petty struggles for power and supremacy could 
be dressed in more attractive clothing and tied to loftier goals that had strong cultural appeal. 
Cooperation was thus easier to achieve, and recognition of the new ruler and his state as more 
legitimate, if it could be linked to an admired (if long gone) empire rather than being viewed as an 
unwelcome innovation imposed by a usurping power-hungry clique. 
Because empires of nostalgia draw their power from the realm of cultural memory, they do not 
travel well. The West's infatuation with ancient Rome has little resonance in China, nor does the 
epic rise and fall of Chinese dynasties stir any emotion in the West. Yet in their own realms, such 
remembrances of empires past can be tenacious. Indeed, it appears the only way to kill the 
nostalgia for one is to inculcate a new cultural order. While the model of Rome remained strong in 
the West, it was lost to Roman North Africa after the Islamic conquest. From that point on, people 
there were invested in empires of nostalgia drawn from the Islamic tradition. Few were more 
potent than the idea of the caliphate. 
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The caliphate and its new incarnations 
The most powerful empire of nostalgia in the Islamic world has always been the caliphate. Seen 
as a framework for governance sanctified by the Prophet and his immediate successors that 
began in the mid-seventh century CE, its early conquests were spectacularly successful. They 
laid the groundwork not only for a new imperial structure but one uniquely combining the Muslim 
religion and the state. Like most empires, its internal politics were fractious and not very edifying 
for either those who fell victim to them or later historians. Even as the empire expanded 
externally, it was divided by civil wars over who should rule the caliphate. The Umayyad 
Caliphate displaced those who were supporters of the heirs of the Prophet's son-in-law ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib (who maintained a distinct identity as Shi’ites). The Umayyads ruled the caliphate until 750 
when they were displaced by the Abbasids. The Abbasids consolidated their power in part by 
murdering all the Umayyad pretenders they could find. Despite its bloody beginnings, the Abbasid 
dynasty marked the highpoint of caliphal power and has long been viewed as the period of 
Islam's greatest influence culturally and politically. Its power declined in the mid-ninth century 
when it lost control of outlying territories and was challenged by many rebellions. The dynasty lost 
secular authority when conquered by new regional dynasties, beginning with the Buyids from Iran 
in 945. However, the prestige of the caliphate was so high that all succeeding Muslim dynasties 
acknowledged the caliph’s spiritual authority. The caliphate ended when the Mongols sacked 
Baghdad in 1258 and murdered the last caliph, abolishing the institution. Coming from a different 
cultural tradition, they had no particular respect or sympathy for Islamic institutions (although their 
descendants who stayed would eventually adopt the religion).28 The Ottoman sultans, who first 
took up the title for themselves in the fourteenth century, began to stress the importance of the 
institution for their own legitimacy beginning in the eighteenth century, in a fairly successful bid to 
portray themselves as defenders of Islam against the growing power of Christian Europe. 
While appeals to an idealized Islamic past had a long history, particularly in the battle to throw off 
European colonial domination in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam as a framework for 
statebuilding had seemingly lost the battle of ideas to Western democratic, nationalist, or socialist 
movements that either rejected religion outright or reduced its writ to the private sphere. Such 
secular movements all sought to build ideal human societies of some sort and saw religion (of 
whatever type) as an obstacle to achieving their goals. Beginning first with the American and 
French revolutions in the late eighteenth century, religious institutions in the West were stripped 
of any privileged political role even in countries like Britain that still recognized a state religion. 
During the twentieth century, socialist states like the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China attacked religious belief and religious institutions directly, proclaiming atheism as national 
policy. Following the end of World War I, most leaders of newly independent states in Muslim 
majority countries (or those seeking independence) similarly grounded their political legitimacy in 
a variety of secular rather than religious guises: nationalism, kingship, democracy, or radical 
socialism. 
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This can be seen most strongly among the secular nationalists who established all the regimes of 
the Arab world following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire (save Saudi Arabia). They 
viewed religion more as a source of the region’s weakness rather than strength, and believed it 
needed to be cast aside to build state power. Non-Arab Muslim polities adopted similar policies of 
state secularism in pursuit of national development. In the 1920s, it was the core ideology of 
Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who abolished the caliphate in 1924 during his successful drive 
to create a secular republic. Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted to modernize his country by stressing 
Iran’s pre-Islamic greatness under the Persian Empire. Even in distant Afghanistan, King 
Amanullah Khan spent the 1920s attempting to replace a legal system based on Islamic law with 
secular courts employing a secular law code. A British Indian political agent at the time went so 
far as to conclude that the rise of secular modernist reformers was “an illustration of the broad 
fact already noticed that the impulse behind recent movements in the East is nationalist rather 
than religious in character, and that when the two forces come into conflict the advantage lies 
with the nationalist.”29 
Almost a century later, this conclusion appears to have been premature. Beginning with the 
Iranian revolution in 1979, the Islamic world has been swept by a revival of religious political 
movements in which the secular nationalists have been at a clear disadvantage. But the form 
such Islamic movements has taken has varied significantly. Some Sunni Muslim Brotherhood 
followers saw their movement as able to work within the structures of existing secular states, with 
the expectation of moving them toward such religious goals as the implementation of shari'ah 
law. Others sought to implement purely Islamic governments with no inclination to share power. 
In Shi’ite Iran, clerics set the rules of the Islamic Republic and oversaw its management. In the 
Sunni world, Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader of Afghanistan, proclaimed the country an 
independent Islamic emirate and gave himself the title of amīr al-muʾminīn (Commander of the 
Faithful) in 1996. Notably, however, he did not proclaim himself caliph, or suggest that the Afghan 
emirate marked the beginning of a new caliphate. In this he appears to have been following Al-
Qa’idah opinion that a caliphate could only come into existence after the lands of the original 
caliphate (including places no longer Muslim, like Spain) had come under its control. Significantly, 
Mullah Omar was neither an Arab nor from the Prophet's tribe, qualifications historically deemed 
necessary for becoming a caliph (although these criteria had not applied during the many 
centuries when the Ottoman Turkish sultans claimed the title).30 
The shift of the concept of the caliphate from some future culminating endpoint that would 
emerge only after Islam’s final victory over its rivals to a contemporary institution designed to 
bring that victory became manifest in June 2014. At that time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) endorsed Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī’s declaration of himself as caliph in the territories ISIS 
occupied. In sharp contrast to Mullah Omar, Baghdādī is both an Arab and a descendant of the 
Prophet's tribe of Quraysh. The large number of Muslim supporters, including thousands of 
foreign fighters and even women, who have flocked to join in the fight for this new caliphate has 
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surprised many observers. Their enthusiasm for participating in a fight that is not their own is best 
explained by viewing the Islamic State and its declared caliphate as an “empire of nostalgia” that 
attracts precisely because it is an attempt to recreate a lost empire of glory when Muslims were 
politically and culturally dominant. 
The original caliphate was a transnational empire, so those attempting to revive it now see 
themselves as legitimate in reaching out to the entire Muslim ummah for support. Like other 
purveyors of empires of nostalgia, however, its culturally resonant project is based on illusions 
designed to soften a harsher reality. The war the Islamic State portrays as a noble and attractive 
struggle pitting believers against unbelievers to create an ideal Islamic state is in reality a vicious 
civil war conflict within the Muslim community. Only by declaring its equally Muslim opponents 
(albeit of different sects or political factions) kuffār or infidels, apostates worthy of death (that is, 
takfīr), can the new caliphate justify its brutal tactics that bring mass slaughter and oppression to 
the heartland of the old caliphate. 
In this, ISIS lays the foundation for its demise: successful empires succeed by tempering their 
violence through the accommodation of diversity. Power may be won by the sword, but it is 
maintained by softer means. As conquerors of large non-Muslim communities, rulers of the early 
caliphate needed to accommodate indigenous groups and accepted them as long as they 
accepted the caliphate's rule and paid taxes. By contrast, the current Islamic State works in an 
environment in which Muslim communities constitute the vast majority. Ironically, some Christian 
communities have received better protection that their Muslim neighbors because the original 
caliphate granted them specific protections not shared by other religions (such as the Yazidis) or 
those fellow Muslims they have deemed heretical.31 By defining its caliphate so narrowly, they 
risk the fate of similar radical Islamic movements such as the seventh-century Kharijites, who also 
viewed most other Muslims as enemy apostates. They were marginalized and destroyed by 
unified opposition to them in both the Sunni and Shi’ah communities. 
Of all the varieties of shadow empires, an empire of nostalgia is least likely to make the transition 
into a primary empire. Even in China where new dynasties grounded themselves in older imperial 
traditions, that transition was only the finishing touch that transformed conquering rebels and 
foreign invaders into legitimate rulers. In this they resemble what anthropologists call revitalization 
movements whose charismatic leaders seek to bring about a social transformation of the world 
that would empower their followers.32 To attempt the recreation of an old imperial structure on the 
ground, however, invites attack by rivals of all sorts that few such movements could withstand. 
Empires of nostalgia thus do best in a world where there are no powerful state rivals, in times 
when long periods of political turmoil produce a desire for order even where it cannot be 
delivered. Where strong states do exist, such movements are almost always destroyed as 
autonomous political entities, a prospect that often leads to the belief that divine intervention will  
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save the day, as the ISIS Caliphate’s English-language media mouthpiece asserts. Called Dabiq, 
it is named for the site in northern Syria where some believe the Muslim version of 
Armageddon will occur. 
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